^How did al-Albani, with his undistinguished social and ethnic origins, come to occupy such a prestigious position in a field long monopolized by a religious elite from the Saudi region of Najd—The answer is, as we shall see through the example of al-Albani himself and some of his disciples, lies in his revolutionary approach to hadith.
Common knowledge considers Shaykh Nasir al-Din al-Albani to be staunch proponent of Wahhabism, the discourse produced and upheld by the official Saudi religious establishment.This is undoubtedly true in terms of ‘aqidah (creed), yet al-Albani strongly disagrees with the Wahhabis—and especially with their chief representatives, the ulama of the Saudi religious establishment—when it comes to fiqh (law).
For al-Albani, moreover, being a proper “salafi in fiqh” implies making hadith the central pillar of the juridical process, for hadith alone may provide answers to matters not found in the Quran without relying on the school of jurisprudence.
"CORRECTING IMAM BUKHARI (RA)"
“In only 8mintues and 38 seconds”
As a consequence of the peculiarirty of this method, al-Albani ended up pronouncing fatwas that ran counter to the wider Islamic consensus and more specifically to Hanbali/Wahhabi jurisprudence. For instance, he wrote a book in which he redefined the proper gestures and formulae that constitute the Muslim prayer ritual “according to the Prophet’s practice”—and contrary to the prescriptions of all established schools of jurisprudence.
Also not to forget his other fiddle:
The presence of al-Albani in Saudi Arabia—where he was invited in 1961 by his good friend Shaykh ‘Abd al-’Aziz bin Baz to teach at the Islamic University of Medina—prompted embarrassed reactions from the core of the Wahhabi establishment, who disagreed with him but could hardly attack him because of his impeccable Wahhabi credentials in terms of creed.
However, the opposition al-Albani encountered from the Wahhabi religious establishment was not merely intellectual:
From its inception, Wahhabism had established itself as a religious tradition—at the core of which laid a number of key books, both in creed and law. This tradition had been monopolized by a small religious aristocracy from Najd, first centered around Mu-hammad bin ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his descendants (known as the Al al-Shaykh)
Traditional Wahhabi ‘ilm, therefore, was the fruit of a process of transmission and depended on the number of ijazas—a certificate:
For all these reasons, al-Albani’s ideas would rapidly become a means for Salafi religious entrepreneurs from outside the Wahhabi aristocracy to challenge the existing hierarchy.
In the mid-1960s, a number of al-Albani’s disciples in Medina founded al-Jamaa al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasiba (The Salafi Group which Commands Good and Forbids Evil), a radical faction of which, led by Juhayman al-’Utaybi, would storm the grand mosque in Mecca in November 1979.
In the late 1980s, some of al-Albani’s pupils, led by Medinan shaykh called Rabi’ al-Madkhali, formed an informal religious network generally referred to as al-Jamiyya (”the Jamis”, named after one of their key members, Muhammad Aman al-Jami).
In the 1990s, a few students of al-Albani would go so far as to challenge both the Wahhabi religious aristocracy and al-Albani himself.
Mu-hammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani’s denunciation of the “Wahhabi paradox” and his promotion of a new approach to the critique of hadtih as the pillar of religious knowledge have prompted a revolution within Salafism, challenging the very monopoly of the Wahhabi religious aristocracy.
Actually the hadith of 40 prayers in Masjid an-Nabwi is authentic and it is Dajl/lie of Albani to call it weak.