By
actions the Asħˆariyys mean the created things themselves that
exist by the influence of Aļļaah’s attribute of power, or what
they call effective pertainment.
Effective pertainment is the
pertaining of Aļļaah’s power to what exists of created things, as
opposed to valid pertainment, which is the pertaining Aļļaah’s
power to everything possible.
The Maaturiidiyys say that
the attribute of power is Aļļaah’s power to bring into existence,
while the bringing into existence is another attribute called
takwiin.
So what Asħˆariyys explain as
(1)
"effective pertainment" and
(2) "valid
pertainment" is explained as two attributes, respectively:
(1)
"takwiin" or "creating" and
(2) "power
to create" according to Maaturiidiyys.
Aļļaah’s
providing, giving, bringing into existence, etc. is called effective
pertainment in the Asħˆariyy school, while in the Maaturiidiyy
school these are different names for takwiin according to what the
attribute of takwiin pertains to.
When
we remember that Aļļaah
is not in time according to all, then it becomes easy to
understand that this is mainly a semantical difference; using
different words to explain the same thing.
Although the
Asħˆariyys say that the effective pertainment has a beginning, this
is with respect to us, because we are in time.
So
we say that Jill was created yesterday, but the time element of
yesterday is a created attribute of Jill, where as the attribute of
Aļļaah is creating Jill with the "yesterday" as one of
her attributes, the meanings associated with her being, sort of like
color.
In other words, Aļļaah does not pass through a state of
time called before creating Jill and after creating Jill, because He
is not in time.
This means that Aļļaah Himself did not change during those six days in which He created the Heavens and the Earth. What changed is creation; those six days are for creation.
Accordingly,
the Imam of Guidance, Abuu Manşuur Al-Maaturiidiyy says:
“A fundamental belief principle is that whenever Aļļaah is
ascribed an attribute, then this attribute is eternal (i.e. without a
beginning or end). One says that He is attributed with knowledge,
power and providing eternally without a beginning and without an
end.
If He is mentioned with regard to His management of
creation and orders to it, then time is stated, but this time is for
creation, not for Him.
For example, it is said, "Aļļaah
knows eternally that you are sitting here," or "(sitting
here) at this time."
I.e. Aļļaah knows eternally without
a beginning or an end that the person is sitting now…. This is all
to prevent people from thinking "How were the created things in
eternity?” [1]
An-Nasafiyy, the
second most important scholar in the Maaturiidiyy school after
Al-Maaturiidiyy himself, said:"His eternal attribute of creating
does not lead to saying that the world is eternal, because the
possible in existence cannot be eternal, and because creating is not
for the immediate existence of the created, but for the time of its
existence."[2]
He
also said: "The Karraamiyyah all claimed that Aļļaah’s
creating (takwiin) is an event in Aļļaah with a beginning, and that
events occur in Aļļaah. Aļļaah is greatly above what the unjust
ascribe to Him." [3]
It must be understood that Aļļaah’s creating is not a sequential action, it is an action without a how. It has no beginning or end. If it was sequential, one previously non-existent action coming into existence after another, then each action would itself need to be brought into existence.
This is because it did not exist previously. Then if that action of bringing the action into existence also had a beginning, we would need a bringing into existence of that one also, etc. to infinity, which would mean that one single act of creating would need an infinite amount of bringings into existence prior to it.
This
means that the act of creating can’t ever exist, because the
prerequisite infinite amount of bringings into existence cannot ever
be concluded.
The solution to this is to say that Aļļaah’s
act of bringing into existence does not have a beginning, and
therefore does not need to be brought into existence.
In other
words, Aļļaah created the world in six days, without His act of
creating it having a beginning or an end, because Aļļaah is not in
time; His attributes do not change and do not renew.
Further
to this concept, here is what the two famous asħˆariyys,
ˆAđududDiin Al-’Iijiyy, and Asħ-Sħariif Al-Jurjaaniyy have to
say about Aļļaah not being in time.
Al-‘Iijiyy’s words are
bolded in brackets, while the rest is Al-Jurjaaniyy’s
explanation [4]:
الشرح (المقصد الرابع إنه تعالى ليس في زمان) أي ليس وجوده وجودا زمانيا ومعنى كون الوجود زمانيا أنه لا يمكن حصوله إلا في زمان كما أن معنى كونه مكانيا أنه لا يمكن حصوله إلا في مكان |
(The fourth topic: on Aļļaah not being in time.) That is, His existence is not in time. The meaning of existence in time is that it cannot be except in time, just as the meaning of existence in a location is that it cannot be except in a location. |
(هذا مما اتفق عليه أرباب الملل ولا نعرف فيه للعقلاء خلافا) وإن كان مذهب المجسمة يجر إليه كما يجر إلى الجهة والمكان |
(This is one of the things that the people of all sects and religions agreed upon, and we do not know of any disagreement upon this between rational beings.) This is so, even if the anthropomorphists imply that, just as they imply direction and location. |
(أما عند الحكماء فلأن الزمان) عندهم (مقدار حركة المحدد) للجهات (فلا يتصور فيما لا تعلق له بالحركة والجهة) |
(As for according to the philosophers, this is because time) according to them (is the amount of limited movement) in any direction (so being in time cannot be true of what does not have to do with movement or direction.) |
وتوضيحه أن التغير التدريجي زماني بمعنى أنه يتقدر بالزمان وينطبق عليه ولا يتصور وجوده إلا فيه والتغير الدفعي متعلق بالآن الذي هو طرف الزمان فما لا تغير فيه أصلا لا تعلق له بالزمان قطعا نعم وجوده تعالى مقارن للزمان وحاصل مع حصوله وأما أنه زماني أو آني أي واقع في أحدهما فكلا |
That is, gradual change is in time, in the sense that it is measured in time, and coincides with time, and its existence cannot be other than in time, and a momentary change defines the “now” which is a the last point in time [i.e. so far]. Accordingly, what does not change at all, is not related to time at all. Yes, Aļļaah’s existence is affirmed as true and real no matter what time one is in, but it is not in time, or momentary. That is, it is not occurring in a time or a moment. |
(وأما عندنا فلأنه) أي الزمان (متجدد يقدر به متجدد فلا يتصور في القديم فأي تفسير فسر) الزمان (به امتنع ثبوته لله تعالى) |
(As for according to us, this is because it) i.e. time (is something renewing by which something else renewing is measured, so it cannot be true of the beginninglessly eternal. Accordingly, no matter how we define it,) i.e. time (it cannot be affirmed as being true of Aļļaah.) |
(تنبيه) على ما يتضمنه هذا الأصل الذي مهدناه آنفا (يعلم مما ذكرنا أنا سواء قلنا العالم حادث بالحدوث الزماني) كما هو رأينا (أو الذاتي) كما هو رأي الحكيم (فتقدم الباري سبحانه عليه) لكونه موجدا إياه (ليس تقدما زمانيا) وإلا لزم كونه تعالى واقعا في الزمان بل هو تقدم ذاتي عندهم وقسم سادس عندنا كتقدم بعض أجزاء الزمان على بعضها |
(Important note) regarding this principle that we have just explained: (It is known from what we mentioned previously that regardless of whether we say that the world has a beginning that is in time) as is our view, (or that it is in being) as is the view of the philosopher (it is still true that the precedence of Aļļaah over creation) by His being its Creator (is not a precedence of time.) Otherwise He would be in time. Rather, it is a precedence of being, according to the philosophers, and a sixth meaning [of precedence] in our view [that is not in time], like the precedence of moments of time over other moments of time [The sixth meaning of precedence is that of Creator over created, not in time, and this is beyond what our minds can grasp, because the reality of Aļļaah's existence cannot be grasped. The precedence of moments of time over other moments is mentioned to show that precedence in existence is not necessarily in time]. |
(و) يعلم أيضا (أن بقاءه ليس عبارة عن وجوده في زمانين) وإلا كان تعالى زمانيا بل هو عبارة امتناع عدمه ومقارنته مع الأزمنة (ولا القدم عبارة عن أن يكون قبل كل زمان زمان) وإلا لم يتصف به الباري تعالى |
(Moreover,) it is also known (that His everlastingness is not an expression meant to indicate His existence in two consecutive times,) otherwise He would be in time. Rather, it is an expression meaning that it is impossible for His to cease to exist, or accompany time [i.e. to be thought of as passing through time]. (Furthermore, His beginningless existence is not meant to express that there is a time before all times,) otherwise it would not be ascribed to Him. |
(وأنه) أي ما ذكرناه من أنه تعالى ليس زمانيا (يبسط العذر في ورود ما ورد من الكلام الأزلي بصيغة الماضي ولو في الأمور المستقبلة) الواقعة فيما لا يزال كقوله تعالى إنا أرسلنا نوحا وذلك لأنه إذا لم يكن زمانيا لا بحسب ذاته ولا بحسب صفاته كان نسبة كلامه الأزلي إلى جميع الأزمنة على السوية إلا أن حكمته تعالى اقتضت التعبير عن بعض الأمور بصيغة الماضي وعن بعضها بصيغة المستقبل فسقط ما تمسك به المعتزلة في حدوث القرآن من أنه لو كان قديما لزم الكذب في أمثال ما ذكر فإن الإرسال لم يكن واقعا قبل الأزل |
(In
addition it) [i.e. the fact we have mentioned regarding Him
(تعالى)
not being in time] (justifies what has been revealed of Aļļaah’s
speech expressed in the past tense, even for what pertains to the
future) and happens with a beginning, such as His saying
(تعالى): |
(وههنا أسرار أخر لا أبوح بها ثقة بفطنتك) منها إذا قلنا كان الله موجودا في الأزل وسيكون موجودا في الأبد وهو موجود الآن لم نرد به أن وجوده واقع في تلك الأزمنة بل أردنا أنه مقارن معها من غير أن يتعلق بها كتعلق الزمانيات |
(There are other hidden realities known through this that I will not mention explicitly, based on trust in your intelligence.) Among these is the fact that if we say “Aļļaah existed before creation, and shall exist forever, and He exists now,” then we do not mean by this that His existence falls in these times. Rather, we mean that His existence is true at all times, without Him being in them the way things in time are. |
ومنها أنه لو ثبت وجود مجردات عقلية لم تكن أيضا زمانية |
Another [fact known from this] is that if it was established that there are beings with a beginning that are not in place, then they would not be in time. [This is true according to the philosophers' definition of time, because it is dependent on space. In Sunni terminology, however, it is not acceptable to say that such beings would not be in time. This is because such beings would pass through renewed existence, as they are not necessary in existence, and can change in knowledge or will, or other attributes.] |
ومنها أنه إذا لم يكن زمانيا لم يكن بالقياس إليه ماض وحال ومستقبل فلا يلزم من علمه بالتغيرات تغير في علمه إنما يلزم ذلك إذا دخل فيه الزمان |
[Yet] another [fact known from this] is that if He is not in time, then the measures of time in terms of past, present and future would not hold true of Him. Accordingly, it is not necessitated from His knowledge of changing things that His knowledge should change. It would only be necessary if He was in time [and He is not.] |
[1] Abuu
Manşuur Al-Maaturiidiyy (333 AH), Ta’wiilaat Ahlu-s-Sunnah,
9/473.
[2] Abu-l-Muˆiin
An-Nasafiyy, Maymuun ibn Muĥammad (508 AH/ 1115 AD),
Tabşiratu-l-Adillah, 1:1/99.
[3] Ibid.,
1:1/401.
[4] Asħ-Sħariif
Al-Jurjaaniyy (740-816 AH/ 1340-1413 AD) and ˆAđudu-d-Diin
Al-‘Iijiyy (756 AH/ 1355 AD), Sħarĥu-l-Mawaaqif, 3/41.
---
Abu-l-Muˆiin
An-Nasafiyy, Maymuun ibn Muĥammad (508 AH/ 1115
AD).
Tabşiratu-l-Adillah. Edited by Dr. Huuseyin Atay. Vol. 1.
2 vols. Turkey: Ri’aasat al-Shu’uun al-Diiniiyyah
lil-Jumhuuriyyah al-Turkiyyah, 1993.
Abuu Manşuur
Al-Maaturiidiyy (333 AH).
Ta’wiilaat Ahlu-s-Sunnah. Beirut,
Lebanon: Dar Al-Kotob Al-ilmiyah, 1426.
Asħ-Sħariif
Al-Jurjaaniyy (740-816 AH/ 1340-1413 AD),
Ađudu-d-Diin
Al-‘Iijiyy (756 AH/ 1355 AD).
Sħarĥu-l-Mawaaqif. 3 vols.
Beirut, Lebanon: Dar al-Jiil – Shaamilah, 1997.
---
(Edited by ADHM)
